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ABSTRACT
UsingJapanese annual time series data covering the period from 1946
to 1982, this paper shows that social security wealth depresses personal
savings. The effect was a reduction of approximately 143 thousand yen per
capita wealth in real terms from 1970 to 1980. However, declining labor
force participation of the elderly (i.e., earlier retirement), stimulates
personal saving by an estimated 12 thousand yen over the same period. The
study found that the benefit effect dominates the retirement effect. In
addition, this study has identified a negative interdependency between the
personal savings and labor retirement behaviors of the elderly; that is, an
individual saves more before retirement if he expects to stay a shorter
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I. Introduction
Ever since its institution, the social security system has alleviated
the financial problems of the elderly under changing economic and social
conditions. Recently, in the United States, this system has come under
fire. The main thrust of this attack is twofold: (1) that personal savings
decline as compulsory public savings, such as social security retirement
benefits, increase and (2) that social security retirement benefits have
created a trend towards earlier retirement.
In the debate over social security and savings in the United States,
the pivotal issue continues to be whether social security retirement bene-
fits increase or decrease personal savings. Despite an abundance of
empirical studies on this issue, no conclusion has been agreed upon.1
Boskin's (1977) pioneering study of the effect of social security
retirement benefits on the retirement decision concludes that social
security retirement benefits influence the elderly to leave their jobs
early or to restrict their market work, thereby reducing the labor supply
*We are indebted to Michael Grossman, Koichi Hamada, Yoshio Higuchi,
Charlotte Muller, Takatoshi Ito, Kazuo Sato, Hugh Patrick, and Frank
Chaloupka for their helpful comments on preliminary drafts of this paper.
The opinions expressed in this paper, as well as any errors, are mine. The
original paper was presented at the Japan Economic Seminar at Harvard
University, Cambridge, April 1987.
1Feldstein (1974; 1982), Feldstein and Pellechio (1979), Munnell
(1974), and Darby (1979) find a significant negative effect of social
security retirement benefits on personal savings, whereas Barro (1978),
Blinder, Gordon and Wise (1983), Leimer and Lesnoy (1982), Lesnoy and
Leimer (1985) and Modigliani and Sterling (1983) find it to be insignifi-
cant.-2—
of the elderly (see Pellechio 1979, Burtless and Moffitt 1984 and 1985,
Hurd and Boskin 1984, Mitchell and Fields 1984, and Burtless 1986, which
support this induced retirement effect). In contrast, Blinder, Gordon and
Wise (1980) do not reject the hypothesis that social security retirement
benefits delay the retirement of the elderly.2
These results suggest that the effects of social security retirement
benefits on personal savings and the retirement decisions of the elderly
are still open to debate. This paper examines the effects of social
security on personal savings and labor force participation of elderly men.
This sort of application is useful for several reasons. First, it helps
us to understand implications of retirement policies. Secondly, if social
security retirement benefits reduce lifetime personal savings and lower the
labor supply of the elderly, capital formation and aggregate labor supply
are reduced and, hence, aggregate output is lowered (Burtless and Moffitt
1984). Finally, a quantitative evaluation of the effects of social
security retirement benefits on personal saving behavior and labor force
participation of the elderly rests on empirical studies.3
Very few such studies have been done in Japan. Noguchi (1983) finds
the effect of gross social security wealth on household net wealth to be
negative, but significant in only one of many specifications. Other stu-
dies, for examples, Ishikawa and Iieda (1984), Ando, Yamashita and Murayama
2Burkhauser and Turner (1978; 1982b) come to a similar conclusion as to
the effect of social security on the market work behavior of prime-age
males.
3Burtless (1986) also emphasizes the influence of the timing of changes
in social security retirement benefits on lifetime labor supply and
savings, but the estimation of this type of model depends on development of
much better data than that currently available.—3-
(1986), and Dekle (1986), examine the saving behavior of Japanese
households, but totally ignore the influence of social security retirement
benefits. Some other studies, such as those of Takayama (1982) and Ito
(1983), inquire about the relationship between social security retirement
benefits and the retiremeflt behavior of elderly men: the former is a
theoretical paper, presenting little empirical evidence on the impact of
social security retirement benefits on retirement decisions; the latter,
although empirical, does not use an econometric multivariate analysis.
Consequently, neither of the studies supplies a good estimate of quan-
titative effects.
This study examines the influence of social security retirement bene-
fits on the personal savings and labor force participation of elderly men
in Japan. The hypothesis to be tested is that personal savings over the
life cycle are determined simultaneously with retirement decisions, as
discussed and emphasized by King (1983) and Thompson (1983). using three
different social security retirement wealth measures, the analysis is based
on Japanese annual time series data over the period from 1946 to 1982.
The organization of the subsequent sections is as follows. Section II
contains a brief review of the social security system in Japan. Section
III describes the theoretical model. The empirical results are presented
in Section IV and conclusions in Section V.-4—
II. A Brief Review of the Welfare Pension, Savings and Labor Force
Participation of Elderly
The social security program (Welfare Pension) in Japan was introduced
in 1942 and covers a majority of Japanese workers. It is a partially
funded system, not a pay-as-you-go system.4 Under the Welfare Pension a
flat tax rate of 10.6 is applied to monthly labor earnings up to a maximum
of 410 thousand yen, the minimum being 45 thousand yen for male workers.
The rate is 8.9 for females.5 Half of the social security tax rate is
paid by the employer, as in the U.S.
The receipts of the Welfare Pension tax (social security tax) are
deposited in special treasury accounts (Trust Fund Bureaus) and the fund is
managed by the Treasury Investment and Loans Division. As of 1985, the
accumulated pension fund was 27,983 billion yen. For the purpose of
improving living conditions, the fund is used for housing, living environ-
ment improvements, small enterprises, culture, education, agriculture,
forestry, fisheries, etc. The proceeds of the interest payments are used
for a part of administrative costs of the social security program.
Retirement benefits of the Japanese Welfare Pension (social security
retirement benefits, or SSRB) are indexed to the inflation rate and
generally require contributions for a minimum of 20 years. The normal
retirement age is 60 for men and 55 for women.6 The basic schedule of
4Another social security retirement program is the National Pension for
self-employed workers and housewives who are not in the paid labor force.
5After April, 1986, the rates were raised to 12.4 percent and 11.3 per-
cent for male and female workers, respectively.
6After April, 1986, the normal retirement age for female workers was
raised to sixty years old with gradual adjustments.-5-
monthly social security retirement benefits for a typical individual'9"
is given as follows (Japan, White Paper on Welfare 1983):
SSRB1 =2'050yen
x T{T=20 if T.20; T=T if 20 <T.
<35;
l2Ti
and 1=35 if l >35}+(( Ew,/12 1.)
t=1
x (1/100) x T] (1)
where number of preretirement working years, and W1 monthly labor
earnings at time t.The amount of monthly social security retirement
benefits is reduced according to the amount of an individual's monthly
labor earnings as shown in Table i.
[Table 1 should be here]
The ratio of social security retirement benefits to disposable income
per capita in real terms was only about 50*, on average, duringthe 10
years 1972-1982. The replacement rates of a social security,old-age,
pension for a single worker in Japan were 26* in 1969, 37*in 1975 and 54*
in 1980. The relatively low replacement rates in Japan compared to the
United States seems to have some relation to Japanese saving behavior.The
ratio of personal savings to disposable income in real per capita terms
was about 20* on the average during the 10 years 1972-1982.This ratio is
remarkably high compared to the ratio (about 5*, on average) inthe United
States.
In 1953 the ratio of personal savings to disposable income suddenly
declined from 17.6* in 1952 to 11.2* in 1953, and the low ratio continued
7A typical retired male with zero working hours a month received 136
thousand yen per month in 1983, based on the condition that he, with spouse
present, had worked for 30 years. The replacement rate, proxied bythe
ratio of social security retirement benefits to personal disposable income-6-
until 1958. Then the ratio of personal savings to disposable income
increased to 16.7% in 1959 from 13.5% in 1958.
Coincidentally the labor force participation rate of males ages 60 and
over increased to 73.5% in 1953 from 68.5% in 1952. The rate remained high
until 1958, and then dropped from 74.3% in 1958 to 69.9% in 1959. The
ratios of personal savings to disposable income have been relatively high:
18.9% on the average since 1960. The labor force participation rates had
been gradually declining since 1960. Therefore, there seems to be some
negative relationship between the ratio of personal savings to disposable
income and the labor force participation of men ages 60 and over. The
overall labor force participation of the elderly in Japan, however,
declined by about 10 percentage points from 1946 through 1982.
A primary, goal of the present paper is to study the effects of social
security retirement benefits on personal savings in the preretirement
period and the labor force behavior of the elderly.8 Therefore, the paper
focuses on the labor force participation rates of the elderly, ages 60 and
over, rather than the labor supply, that is, hours of work. An advantage
of using the labor force participation rate of the elderly is that one can
view the outcome in this multivariate analysis as the probability of
retirement for the elderly.
per capita in real terms, was about 50 percent, on average, over the period
from 1970 to 1982. This rate is low in comparison to the U.S. standard
(Aldrich 1982) and may have encouraged the Japanese to maintain a high rate
of personal savings.
8Japanese workers normally retire from their lifetime jobs at the age
of 60, at which time they are entitled to receive social security retire-
ment benefits (as of 1985). In this study, the period before the age of 60
is called the preretirement period and the period beginning at age 60 is
called the postretirement period.—7—
III. Theoretical Model
Social security retirement benefits affect the the life-cycle savings
and labor supply decisions of an individual simultaneously. If the indivi-
dual anticipates social security retirement benefits and saves less during
the preretirement period, this is the benefit effect.If, however, he
expects to retire earlier due to the anticipated benefits, he may increase
his rate of savings during the preretirement period; this is the retirement
effect. Which of the two effects will dominate is a testable hypothesis
and is an empirical matter.
The social security wealth variable in the model can assume three
alternative forms: gross social security wealth GSSW, net social security
wealth NSSW, and social security tax contributions SSTC.








SSBt social security retirement benefits per person at time t,
=percapita disposable income of an individual of age a
at time t,
1.601a =probabilityof an individual of age a to survive until
age 60,
60 =probabilityof an individual of age 60 to survive at
least to age k, k>60-8-
=growthrate of per capita income at time t,
Pt
=inflationrate at time t, and
=rateat which an individual discounts his expected
social security retirement benefits at time t.
In constructing the social security wealth variable, Leimer and Lesnoy
(1982) and Lesnoy and Leimer (1985) suggest modifying the original social
security wealth variable used by Feldstein (1974) and Munnell (1974). This
study takes into account the suggestion by Leimer and Lesnoy (1982). For
example, Aat Bt. L60 a' L 60' and a,t are not constant in the analysis.
(2) Net Social Security Wealth (NSSW) is defined as:
NSSWat =GSSWat -SSTAXat (3)
where NSSWat =netsocial security wealth of an individual of age a at
time t,
59
SSTAXat =ERa,t x L x 0a t x [(l+g)/(1÷i)]Ja
jia
SSTAXa
=presentvalue of social security tax per person of age a
at time t,
Ra
=ratioof social security tax per covered worker of age a
to per capita disposable income at time t, and
a
=probabilityof an individual of age a to survive until age j.
(3) Social Security Tax Contributions (SSTC) is defined as:
SSTCa,t =OASDIat 'CPI (4)
where OASDIa=contributionsof an individual of age a at time t
under the old—age, survivors and disability insurance of
the Welfare Pension program, and
CPI. =consumerprice index at time t.-.9-
The amounts of savings and social security retirement benefits exert
different influences on the quantity of lifetime labor supply. Conversely,
labor supply affects life-cycle savings. Consequently, a model should
reflect not only the effects of social security retirement benefits upon
the personal savings and labor force behavior of elderly, but also the
interactions between the two behaviors. The specification of our simulta-






where the variables in the model are defined in Table 2 (the subscript "i"
is omitted for brevity), and u and v are residual terms, assumed
independent, with zero means and constant variances.9
(Table 2 should be here)
The rationale for including the variables in the model is found in
similar studies in the literature (Barro 1978, Burkhauser and Turner 1978
and 1982b, Feldstein 1974, Leimer and Lesnoy 1982, Munnell 1974, and
Noguchi 1983). Therefore, only the variables of interest are discussed.
In the personal savings equation (equation 5), the coefficient of social
security wealth reflects both the benefit and retirement effects, but does
not allow for the separate estimation of each effect (Leimer and Lesnoy
1982). Hence, this study includes the labor force participation rate of
91n the model, the omission of a LF6O variable from equation (5) would
cause the estimated coefficient on the SSW variable to be biased towards
zero. This happens if a1 and a2 are negative and if SSW and LF6O are nega-
tively correlated.— 10—
menages 60 and over to capture the retirement effect (see Munnell 1974).
It is common to relate consumption to permanent income by using a
distributed lag on past income. Therefore, it is reasonable to employ
lagged disposable income in the extended life cycle saving model (Barro,
1978; Darby, 1979; and Leimer and Lesnoy, 1982). Even though lagged
disposable income does not affect the current flow of resources, it has a
positive effect on personal savings if, given the value of current dispo-
sable income and other variables, the variable has a positive impact on
current personal savings.
This study includes two different wealth variables: WEALTH1 includes
physical assets (e.g., houses), which are less liquid than WEALTH2 (e.g.,
stocks, bonds, trusts and insurance). In Japan, physical assets are usually
held through life for a bequest purpose rather than a speculative one (Sato
1987); therefore, illiquid wealth, WEALTH1, will have a different impact on
personal savings than WEALTH2.
The product of U and YD (UYD) is included in the savings function to
adjust for the cyclical variation in personal savings and for the deviation
of income from the normal position (Barro, 1978). The deviation of income
from its normal position, represented by UYD, will make the individual
anxious about future prospects and hence motivate him to increase his per-
sonal savings. Japanese business firms accumulate retirement pension
allowances for their employees. These allowances are 40 percent tax deduc-
tible and are transferable by firms into retained earnings (RETAIN). An
increase in retirement pensions funded by firms tends to discourage indivi-
dual personal savings. An increase in the governments budget surplus— 11—
(GOVTSUR)has a positive influence on personal savings through an increase
in future disposable income from the lowering of taxes and the pricelevel
(Barro 1978).
In the labor force participation equation (equation 6), an increasein
social security wealth (SSW) may induce earlier retirement, resultingin a
prolonged retirement period. Consequently, the labor force participationof
the elderly (LF6O) declines. Why is the labor force participation rateat
age sixty and over one of the independentvariables? Barro's and
Feldstein'S interpretation of social security wealth measured in their
models does not include a variable which explicitly measures the retirement
effect of social security retirement benefits (Leimer and Lesnoy, 1982).
SSW alone measures both effects, but does not allow for the separateesti-
mation of each one. An additional variable is needed to explain the
retirement effect.1° Higher personal savings (S) will make it less
necessary for the elderly in the postretirement periodto stay in the labor
market and earn for consumption.
Education (EOUC) widens the choice of job opportunities, by making
new types of employment available to the elderly at the ageof 60, after
their lifetime jobs, and consequently influences the individual'sretire-
ment. Thus, a rise in EDUCA increases the years of laborforce par-
ticipation (Harioch and Honig 1983; Modigliani 1986). An accelerating
industrial development in Japan has provided the elderly with job oppor-
tunities, while the opportunity for employment in the agriculturalsector
10Since a mandatory retirement age implicitly exists at the age between
55 and 60 under the Japanese lifetime employment system, this study uses
the labor force participation of males aged 60 and over.Munnell (1974)
uses a labor force participation of males aged 65 and overfor the U.S.
study. The starting age for receiving social securityretirement benefits- 12-
(AGRICL)has declined. AGRICL, therefore, will have a negative effect on
LF6O.
Finally, the simultaneous equation model provides estimates of the
effects of social security wealth, separately, on personal savings and
labor force participation of the elderly. In addition, the empirical
results will shed light on the interdependency of lifetime personal saving
and labor force behavior of the elderly.
is sixty in Japan.— 13—
IV.Empirical Results
The data used to estimate the model are an annual time series covering
the period from 1946 to 1982. The simultaneous equation model Consists of
an equation for personal savings and an equation for the retirement deci-
sions of men ages 60 and over. Table 3 presents the second-stage results
after correcting for serial correlation. The social security wealth
variable takes three alternative forms: gross social security wealth GSSW
in model I, net social security wealth NSSW in model II, and social
security tax Contributions SSTC in model III. The alternative forms will
show the sensitivity of the empirical results to the different specifica-
tions of the social security wealth variable.
(Table 3 should be here]
One of the robust results in the personal savings equation (the S
columns) is that the social security wealth variables, GSSW, NSSW, and
SSTC, are statistically significant and negative. Another striking result
is that the estimated coefficients on the labor force participation rate of
men ages 60 and over, LF6O, are negative and statistically significant in
models I and II. On the other hand, in the labor force participation
equation (the LF6O columns), the estimated coefficients on the personal
savings variable are significantly negative in all models. Therefore,
simultaneity exists between personal savings and retirement decisions of
the elderly.
Concerning the effect of social security wealth on personal savings,
the marginal propensity to save with respect to GSSW, NSSW, and SSTC is— 14—
—0.004in model I, -0.005 in model II, and -0.979 in model III, respec-
tively. The point elasticities evaluated at the sample means are -1.56
(GSSW), —1.65 (NSSW), and —0.49 (SSTC). In terms of elasticity, the magni-
tude of anticipated social security retirement benefits (GSSW and NSSW) is
substantially greater than that of current social security tax contribu-
tions (SSTC): the first two elasticities are three times larger than the
last one. Utilizing these estimated elasticities, the study examines the
relative contributions of GSSW, NSSW, and SSTC to the recent Japanese per-
sonal savings experience for the period of 1970-1980. Personal savings per
capita in real terms increased by 68 thousand yen from 140 thousand yen in
1970 to 208 thousand yen in 1980. The increase in GSSW and NSSW over the
period resulted in approximately a 143 thousand yen reduction in personal
savings per capita in real terms, while the increase in SSTC resulted in a
77 thousand yen reduction in personal savings.11 Therefore, personal savings
are depressed by approximately 68 percent due to the increase in GSSW and
NSSW, ceteris paribus, while the reduction in savings due to the increase
in SSTC is by approximately 53 percent.
The point elasticities of personal savings with respect to the labor
force participation of elderly males, LF6O, are -1.36 in model I, -1.46 in
model II, and -0.76 in model III, at the sample means. A reduction in LF6O,
(i.e., earlier retirement), makes individuals in the preretirement period
save more for consumption during a prolonged postretirement period. The
estimated impact on personal savings of earlier retirement was about a 23
lIThe method for this calculation is adapted from Shapiro and Shaw
(1983). The estimated reductions in personal savings during the period
from 1960 to 1980 were about 291 thousand yen due to the effects of GSSW
(or NSSW) and about 118 thousand yen due to that of SSTC. In this period
personal savings per capita in real terms increased by 143 thousand yen,- 15-
thousandyen increase in personal savings per capita in real terms from
1960 to 1980 and a 12 thousand yen increase from 1970 to 1980. Hence,
during the two periods from 1960 to 1980 and from 1970 to 1980, the abso-
lute amount of the upward impact of the retirement effect (LF6O) on per-
sonal savings was about one-tenth of the amount of downward impact of the
anticipated social security retirement benefits effect (GSSW and NSSW) and
about one-fifth of the amount of downward impact of the social security ta
contributions (SSTC). The benefit effect outweighs the retirement effect
and the net effect consequently depresses personal savings.
In LF6O equations, the estimated coefficients on the personal savings
variable are significant and negative: -0.039, -0.039, and —0.040, in
models I, II, and III, respectively, implying that an increase in personal
savings induces earlier retirement, i.e., reduces labor force participation.
As previously discussed, the marginal propensity to save with respect to
LF6O is also observed to be significantly negative. These two results
suggest a negative interdependency between the personal savings and labor
force behaviors of the elderly. The point elasticities evaluated at the
sample means indicate that a one percent increase in personal savings will
lead to a reduction in the labor force participation rate of the elderly,
i.e., earlier retirement, in the range 0.052 to 0.060 percent.
Most of the other variables are statistically significant and have the
from 65 thousand yen in 1960 to 208 thousand yen in 1980. The estimated
reductions obtained from Models I and II are invariant since the estimated
coefficients on social security wealth variables are very insensitive to
the specifications.- 16-
expectedsigns. The estimated positive coefficients on physical assets,
WEALTHI, in both the personal savings and labor force participation
equations indicate the stimulation of personal saving effort for the pur-
pose of obtaining a house and the long mortgage payment which is likely to
postpone an individual's retirement. The retained earnings variable,
RETAIN, has a significantly negative impact on personal savings, suggesting
that an increase in anticipated private retirement pensions provided by
firm results in lower personal savings. The government surplus variable,
GOVTSUR, has a significantly positive effect on personal savings.
In sum, social security retirement benefits have a negative effect on
personal savings, i.e., the benefit effect, and declining labor force par-
ticipation has a positive effect on personal savings, i.e., the retirement
effect. The benefit effect dominates the retirement effect.12
'20f equation (5) in section III, dSt /dSSWt=a1+a2x b1 where
=aLF6O/asswt.Our result shows al >ax b1 in absolute value.— 17—
V.Conclusion
In the debate over social security and savings, the pivotal issue con-
tinues to be whether social security retirement benefits increase or
decrease personal savings. Abundant studies fail to produce consistent
results. Therefore, the effect of social security retirement benefits on
personal savings is still open to question in the United States. This
study adapted and applied the methodology used in U.S. studies to Japanese
data; the social security system in Japan is relatively similar to that of
the United States, but few empirical studies have been done.
Despite the fact that life-cycle saving and labor supply behaviors are
mutually determined, studies of the effects of social security retirement
benefits on personal savings and retirement decisions often ignore this
'interdependency. This study has examined the interdependency between the
personal savings and labor force participation of elderly men in Japan.
Using Japanese annual time series data covering the period, from 1946
to 1982, the study shows that social security wealth depresses personal
savings: the effect was approximately a 143 thousand yen reduction per
capita in real term from 1970 to 1980. However, the declining labor force
participation, i.e., expected earlier retirement, stimulates personal
savings, by an estimated 12 thousand yen increase over the same period.
Examination of the estimates shows that the benefit effect dominates the
retirement effect in Japan. In addition, the Study has identified a nega-
tive interdependency between the personal savings and retirement behaviors
of the elderly. That is, an individual saves more before retirement if he— 18-
expectsto stay a shorter time in the labor market, and vice versa.
A lack of understanding of the behavioral patterns of personal saving
and retirement of the elderly can lead to inappropriate policies. The eco-
nometric model estimated in this study is of course based on a number of
maintained assumptions, and it would be useful to relax them in future
research. Given more complete information, such as the timing of changes
in social security rules, and data on private pensions, actual estimation
of a model depends on development of much better data than that currently
available. To advance the understanding of the socioeconomic activities of
the elderly, more studies of this type are required in Japan.R-1
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Table 1. Monthly Social Security Retirement Benefits in Yen (as of 1985)
Age Monthly LaborEarnings Monthly SSRB








150,000 <Wi 0 xSSRB
65and+W1 <150,000 1 xSSRB (fullamount)
150,000 <Wi 0.8x SSRB
Source: Social Insurance Handbook 1983 (1982), The Bureau of Social
Insurance in Japan.
Note. W1 is individual monthly labor earnings, which include wages and
payments in kind. Bonuses are also included if they are given four
times or more a year. Total benefits are social security retirement bene-
fits (SSRB) plus lS,OOOy x F (Fri if spouse is alive; and F=0 otherwise)
+5,000x N(N=min(N,2)} +2,000 x (N-2) (if N1>3, N=2 otherwise),
where N1 is number of dependent ildren.T—2
Table 2. DefinitionS of Variables
Variable
Name Definition
S real per capita personal savings, in 1,000 yen.
LF6O labor force participation rate of males aged 60 and
over.
GSSW as defined by Feldstein and Munnell, real per capita
gross social security wealth, in 1,000 yen, based on
OASDI program (old-age, survivors and disability
insurance under the Welfare Pension Program). There
are some modifications for 055W defined by Feldstein
and Munnell. The ratio of benefits to disposable
income and that of social security tax payment to
disposable income, in per capita, are variable by
using the current rates. Life expectation is variable
based on current male life expectancy.
NSSW as defined by Feldstein and Munnell, real per capita net
social security wealth, in 1,000 yen, based on OASDI
program. Net social security wealth (NSSW) equals gross
social security wealth (GSSW) minus present value of
social security taxes (SSTAX).
ssic as defined by Munnell, real social security tax contri-
butions per person, in 1,000 yen, under OASDI program,
of workers with earnings taxable by social security.
vo real per capita personal disposable income, in 1,000
yen.
WEALTH1 real per capita expense of personal residential
construction, in 1,000 yen, in private sector, at the
beginning of year.
WEALTH2 real per capita net liquidity wealth: stocks, bonds,
trusts and life insurance, in 1,000 yen, at the be-
ginning of year.
UYD the product of male unemployment rate and real per
capita personal disposable income.






GOVTSUR real per capita surplus of the central government
sector, in 1,000 yen.
AGRICL ratio of the number of workers in agriculture and
forestry to total labor force
EDUCA ratio of the number of graduates from Kouto-senmon
gakko (equivalent to junior college), junior college,
senior college and university to people who completed
at least the nine-year compulsory education of elemen-
tary school and junior high school.
Note: The sources are listed in Tables 4 and 4.1.GSSW
NSSW
Table 3. Regression Results of the Impact of Social Security on
Personal Savings and Labor Retirement of
103.55 112.68***113.55* 112.79***95.69
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(2.14) (2.15) (2.18)T —3.1
Table 3 (concluded)
Independent Model I Model II Model III
Variable S LF6O S LF6O S LF6O
Durbin-Watson1.83** 2.12** 1.83** 2.11** 1.91 2.12**
SER 8.74 1.44 8.67 1.44 9.61 1.44
2 0.993 0.936 0.993 0.936 0.989 0.934
*** Significantat 1 percent. **Significantat 5 percent. *Significantat
10 percent.
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses below the estimated coefficients.
Asterisks for the Durbin—Watson statistic represent the acceptance of
the null hypothesis after correction for serial correlation at 5 percent
(orless)significance level. SER is the standard error of the regression.1-4
Table 4. Sources of Data
Social Security
Social security retirement benefits (1944-1983): "Social
Insurance Agency Annual Report," 1965-1983, Social Insurance
Agency Japanese Government.
Social security tax (1944-1983): "Social Insurance Agency
Annual Report," 1965-1983, Social Insurance Agency Japanese
Government.
Savings
Savings (1946—1982): "Annual Economic Statistics," 1960-1983,
Bank of Japan.
"White Paper of National Income," 1930-1960, and "National
Economic Calculation," 1951-1983, Economic Planning Agency.
Labor Force Participation Rate
Labor force participation rate (1946—1982): "Labor Survey,"
1948—1983, Statistics Bureau, Prime Minister's Office, and
Department of Statistical Information in Ministry of Labor,
and Department of Population Census in Prime Minister's Office.
Income
Personal income (1946-1982): "National Income Calculation,"
1951-1983, Economic Planning Agency.
"White Paper of National Income," 1930-1960, Economic
Planning Agency.
"Annual Economic Statistics," 1965, Bank of Japan.
Unemployment Rate
Unemployment rate (1946-1982): "Labor Survey," 1948—1983,
Statistics Bureau, Prime Minister's Office, and Department
of Statistical Information in Ministry of Labor.
Taxes
Income tax (1946—1982): "National Income Calculation," 1951-
1983, Economic Planning Agency,
"White Paper of National Income," 1930—1960, Economic
Planning Agency.
"Annual Economic Statistics," 1965, Bank of Japan.
Price Index
Consumer price index (1945—1982): "Annual EconomicStatistics,"
1960—1983, Bank of Japan, and Department of Statistical
Consultation in Bank of Japan.
GNP deflator (1945—1983): "Annual Economic Statistics,"1960-1983 Bank
of Japan, and Department of Statistical Consultationin Bank of Japan.T -4.1
Table4. Sources of Data (continued)
Population
Population (1945-1983): "Vital Statisticsof Japan," 1960—
1983, Ministry of Health and Welfare.
Life Expectancy
Life Expectancy (1945-1983): "Life Table," 1935—1983,
Japanese Insurance Organization.
Interest Rate
Market and discount rates, and yield of 10 years longterm
bond (1940-1983): "Annual Economic StatiStiCs," 1960—1983,
Bank of Japan, and Department of Statistical Consultation
in Bank of Japan.
Retained Earnings
Retained earnings (1946—1983): "Annual Economic Statistics,"
1960-1983, Bank of Japan.
"White Paper of National Income," 1930-1960, and"National
Economic Calculation," 1951-1983, Economic Planning Agency.
Government Surplus
Government surplus (1946—1983): "Annual EconomicStatistics,"
1960-1983, Bank of Japan.
"White Paper of National Income," 1930-1960, and "National
Economic Calculation," 1951-1983, Economic Planning Agency.
Department of Survey in the Ministry of Finance.
Agriculture and Forestry
Labor Survey (1948—1983), Statistics Bureau, PrimeMinister's
Office.
Education
Education 1946—1982: "Educational Statistical Survey,"
1980—1983, Department of Education.
Wealth, Physical Assets, and Liquidity Assets
"Annual Economic Statistics," 1960—1983, Bank of Japan.
"National Income Calculation," 1951—1983, Economic Planning
Agency.
"Family Income and Expenditure Survey," 1951—1983,Statistics
Bureau, Prime Minister's Office.